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Abstract
This paper studies the security of a recently proposed chaos-based cryptosystem. It is shown that the en-
cryption architecture of this cryptosystem possesses some important problems related to its implementation
and its robustness against noise. Some security problems are also highlighted.
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1. Introduction
Chaotic systems show an ergodic behavior and a high sensitivity with respect to the initial conditions
and the control parameters. These main characteristics of chaos have been exploited in the design of new
strategies to encrypt information. Nevertheless, the efficient design of new chaos-based encryption systems
cannot be done just by selecting a dynamical system that shows a chaotic behavior. Indeed, it is necessary to
select the adequate dynamical system for the chosen encryption architecture. To have a good performance,
the selected chaotic system is expected to be robust, which means it remains chaotic in a continuous range
of the parameter space [1]. Furthermore, the association between the selected dynamical system and the
encryption architecture must result in an invertible and efficient encryption procedure.
In recent years, Pisarchik et al. have proposed a number of cryptosystems based on chaos [2, 3, 4, 5, 6],
some of which [2, 4, 5] have been cryptanalyzed successfully [7, 8, 9, 10]. In [6] a new cryptosystem is
proposed as an improvement of the one described in [4]. In the present paper we show that this new
proposal is also flawed by some old problems of the original one and also by some new problems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section the cryptosystem under study is
described. After that, in Sec. 3 some problems related to the practical implementation of the cryptosystem
are analyzed. Finally, Sec. 4.2 shows some attacks to the cryptosystem under consideration, and the last
section summarizes the results of the previous sections and concludes the paper.
2. Description of the encryption scheme
The encryption scheme described in [6] is based on the logistic map given by
xn+1 = µxn(1− xn), (1)
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where xn ∈ [0, 1] and µ ∈ [3.57, 4]. The maximum value returned by Eq. (1) is reached for xn = 0.5, and it
is given by
xmax = µ/4. (2)
After a number of transient iterations, all the values derived from any initial condition x0 will lie inside the
interval [xmin, xmax], where xmin is the output of Eq. (1) for xn = xmax, i.e.,
xmin =
µ2
4
(
1− µ
4
)
. (3)
In [6] the authors point out that the logistic map might be replaced by other chaotic systems because
the periodic windows of the logistic map, being dense in the parametric interval considered, represent a
problem. One recommended option is a robust chaotic system like the piecewise smooth system proposed
in [1]. Since the cryptanalysis we are going to explain is independent of the choice of the chaotic system, we
direct attention to the implementation with the logistic map, as proposed in [6].
Given an M ×N color image with R, G, B color components, an initialization process is performed to
convert the integer values of each pixel to real numbers that can be encrypted using the above chaotic logistic
map. First, the 2-D image is scanned in the raster order (i.e., left to right, top to bottom) to form three
1-D integer sequences {P ci }MNi=1 (c = R, G and B), where P ci ∈ {0, · · · , 255} denotes the color component c
of the i-th pixel. Then, these three integer sequences are mixed to get a new sequence of integers P as
P = {Pi}hi=1 =
{
PR1 , P
G
1 , P
B
1 , P
R
2 , P
G
2 , P
B
2 , . . . , P
R
MN , P
G
MN , P
B
MN
}
, (4)
where h = 3MN . Finally, P is transformed into an array of floating-point numbers X =
{
x
(i)
0
}h
i=1
, where1
x
(i)
0 = xmin + (xmax − xmin)Pi/255. (5)
The previous equation maps the set of integers {0, 1, . . . , 255} into the phase space of the logistic
map. This map, which is part of the encryption procedure of [6], is therein incorrectly defined as x(i)0 =
Pi/[255(xmax − xmin)] (see Eq. (7) in [6]). It is obvious that this equation cannot ensure xmin ≤ x0 ≤ xmax.
We correct this error in this present paper.
After the above initialization, the encryption proceeds by performing the following steps:
• Step 1 : Taking y0 and µb ∈ [3.57, 4] as the initial condition and the control parameter, respectively,
iterate the logistic map h times to get a chaotic sequence {yi}hi=1. Let us denote the minimal and
maximal values of the chaotic orbit of the logistic map with control parameter µb by ymin and ymax,
which are the values obtained by replacing µ with µb in Eqs. (3) and (2), respectively.
• Step 2 : A chaotic key sequence K = {ki}hi=1 is derived from the above chaotic sequence {yi}hi=1 via
the following equation:
ki = round((h− 1)(yi − ymin)/(ymax − ymin)) + 1 ∈ {1, . . . , h}. (6)
If ki = i happens, set ki = (ki − 1) mod h.
• Step 3 : For i = 1, . . . , h, take x(i)0 and µa ∈ [3.57, 4) as the initial condition and control parameter,
respectively, and iterate the logistic map n times to get x(i)n , which is then used to update the value
of the ki-th element of X =
{
x(i)
}h
i=1
as follows:
x(ki) =
(
x(i)n + x
(ki)
)
mod 1. (7)
This last step is repeated R rounds to finish the encryption procedure.
1In [6], the authors used a wrong equation: x
(i)
0 = Pi/[255(xmax − xmin)]. It is obvious that this equation cannot ensure
xmin ≤ x0 ≤ xmax. We correct this error in this present paper.
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After performing the above encryption procedure, the ciphertext C is given by2
C = {ci}hi=1 =
{
round(255 · x(i))
}h
i=1
=
{
cR1 , c
G
1 , c
B
1 , . . . , c
R
MN , c
G
MN , c
B
MN
}
. (8)
It is stated in [6] that the secret key consists of the following four sub-keys:
1. The control parameter of the logistic map used in Step 1 (for the generation of the chaotic key sequence
K), i.e., µb.
2. The initial condition of the logistic map used in Step 1, i.e., y0.
3. The control parameter of the logistic map used in Step 3 (for updating the elements of X), i.e., µa.
4. The number of chaotic iterations in Step 3, i.e., n.
5. The number of encryption rounds, i.e., R.
Decryption proceeds similarly to encryption but in reverse order. For more details about the encryp-
tion/decryption procedures, the reader is referred to [6].
The authors of [6] also mention that the control parameter µa can be dynamically generated by iterating
another logistic map with the control parameter µc from a given initial condition z0. In this case, µc and
z0 replace the role of µa in the secret key. Furthermore, they add the possibility of using different initial
conditions y0 and z0 for each encryption round. To avoid complicating unnecessarily the description of our
cryptanalysis, we will focus on the basic implementation of the cryptosystem.
3. Implementation problems
3.1. Use of non-invertible functions
An efficient cryptosystem must allow the perfect recovery of the plaintext from the ciphertext when
the key is known. Yet the algorithm in [6] includes some transformations that cannot be inverted, thus
implying an error in the decryption. First of all, if the cryptosystem described in [6] is implemented using
floating-point arithmetic, then the cryptosystem is impaired by the round-off operations of that arithmetic.
This problem was also present in the previous proposal of the authors [4], as it has been pointed out in [9]
and in [8, Sec. III.B]. Indeed, Eq. (7) in the Step 3 of the encryption procedure is a non-invertible function
when floating-point arithmetic is used. On the other hand, it is emphasized in [6] that the ciphertext is a
discretized version of the vector X in the last encryption round (see Eq. (8)). This discretization procedure
is based on the round function, which is a non-bijective function that impedes the reconstruction of X from
C. This problem can be easily overcome by selecting X as ciphertext.
In order to confirm the above assertions, some experiments were done. First, we study the problem
derived from the implementation using floating-point operations and, consequently, we consider that the
ciphertext is given by X. The plain image in Fig. 1 was encrypted and later decrypted, with secret key
µa = 3.9898, µb = 4, y0 = 0.8989, n = 100, and R = 4. Figure 2 depicts (a) the cipher-image, (b) the result
of the decryption process, and (c) the difference between the original image and the recovered image. In
order to quantify the underlying decryption error, the Mean Square Error (MSE) was computed. For P and
P ′ being a plain image and the decrypted image respectively, the MSE for the color component c is defined
as
MSEc =
m∑
i=1
(P ic − P ′ic)2/m, (9)
where c ∈ {R,G,B}, m = M × N is the number of pixels of the images considered, and the sequences{
P ic
}m
i=1
and {P ′c}mi=1 are the result of scanning P and P ′ in the raster order. For the key settings above,
2In Step 3 of Sec. 2.4 in [6], the authors highlight that X is recovered from C doing X = C/[255(xmax − xmin)]. It seems
to be an error, since it is possible to have either x(i) < xmin or x
(i) > xmax.
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Figure 1: The plain image “Lena”.
the results were MSER = 8189.8541, MSEG = 7028.8354, and MSEB = 5527.4588. This underlying error
can be easily avoided by truncating the values returned by Eq. (7). Hereafter we work with double precision
floating-point arithmetic, but we store only the first 14 decimal digits of the values obtained through Eq. (7).
Next we analyze the problem derived from using the round function to generate the ciphertext. In this case
we consider the original cryptosystem, where the ciphertext is given by C, but the problem with the floating-
point arithmetic was solved according to our previous recommendation. The plain image given by Fig. 1
was encrypted using the same key as above. The encrypted image was later decrypted using the same key,
and the MSEs for the red, green and blue components were 9878.2642, 8497.4556, 6701.2127, respectively.
Consequently, the ciphertext of the scheme described in [6] cannot be the one given by Eq. (8). In the sequel
we overcome this problem by selecting X as ciphertext. Finally, we tested the improved image encryption
scheme with the two suggested enhancements, and the MSEs dropped to zeros.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: Analysis of the underlying decryption error due to the round-off operations of floating-point arithmetic. (a) Ciphertext
of the plain image “Lena”. (b) Recovered image of “Lena” using the same key. (c) The error image between the original and
the recovered “Lena”.
3.2. Robustness against noise
A well designed encryption system must guarantee the diffusion property, i.e., a small change in either
the key or the plaintext must lead to a totally different ciphertext. Therefore if the ciphertext is slightly
modified, then the decryption process should return a plaintext totally different from the original one. The
authors of [6] claim that their cryptosystem implements a good diffusion procedure. At the same time, they
also claim that the cryptosystem is robust against noise, which contradicts the previous assertion about
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diffusion. In order to clarify this point, we performed some simulations where the ciphertext was modified
by randomly selecting 8 bytes of the ciphertext, which were later modified with deviation equal to 10−14.
For µa = 3.9898, µb = 4, y0 = 0.8989, n = 100, and R = 1, the image shown in Fig. 1 was encrypted,
then modified through the 8 selected pixels, and finally decrypted. The MSEs between the original image
and the one obtained after decryption were (7377.6144, 6266.0972, 4859.0834). Fig. 3(a) shows the result
of decryption. If we increase the number of rounds from 1 to 4, the MSEs were (10447.1534, 8987.2725,
7062.4080), and the decrypted image is shown in Fig. 3(b). As a result, we conclude that the cryptosystem
is not robust against noise.
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Decrypted images when 8 values of the ciphertext are modified by introducing a deviation equal to 10−14. The
parameters used in the experiments are: µa = 3.9898, µb = 4, y0 = 0.8989, n = 100, and the number of rounds is (a) R = 1;
(b) R = 4.
4. Security Problems
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Leaking of perceptual information when “Lena” is encrypted with µa = 3.9898, y0 = 0.8989, n = 100, R = 3, and
(a) µb = 4; (b) µb = 3.6898.
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4.1. Unencrypted pixels
Assuming the chaotic key sequence {ki}hi=1 is an i.d.d. sequence, we have Prob(ki = j) = p0 = 1/(h−1),
where j 6= i. Then, the probability that one pixel will not be encrypted by any other h − 1 pixels is
p1 = (1 − p0)h−1. When h is relatively large, p1 = e−1 ≈ 0.3679. For R rounds of encryption, the final
probability that each pixel is not encrypted becomes pR = pR1 = e
−R ≈ 0.3679R. In [6], the recommended
range of R is {3, . . . , 11}. Taking R = 3, we have pR ≈ 0.0498, which means that around 5% of all pixels
are not encrypted at all. This is apparently not a good feature for an image encryption scheme. The
implications of the previous theoretical analysis have been examined by means of experimental simulations.
Figure 4 shows the leaking of perceptual information from the encrypted image corresponding to Fig. 1 for
two different keys with R = 3. A more exhaustive analysis of the rate of unencrypted pixels is performed in
Fig. 5. It informs about a deviation from the theoretical expected behavior, which is a consequence of the
non-uniform probability distribution function associated to the orbits of the logistic map. This is the reason
why for µb = 4 the percentage of unencrypted pixels is around 10% for R = 3, instead of being around 5%.
Furthermore, different values of µb lead to probability distribution functions with different shapes, which
implies different rates of unencrypted pixels as shown in Fig. 5. Therefore, the efficiency of the cryptosystem
defined in [6] requires to replace the logistic map by other chaotic map with uniform probability distribution
function for all the values of the control parameter. Indeed, the ergodicity of a chaotic map must be analyzed
thoroughly when it is selected as the core of a chaos-based cryptosystem [11, Sec. 2.3].
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Figure 5: Percentage of unencrypted pixels with respect to the number of encryption rounds. The parameters used in the
experiments are: µa = 3.9898, y0 = 0.8989, n = 100. Three different situations have been considered: selection of pixels to
encrypt according to the logistic map with µb = 3.6898 and µb = 4, and selection of pixels based on a random sequence with
uniform probability distribution function.
4.2. Timing attack
The encryption/decryption time (EDT) should not be dependent on the value of the key. In [6] it is
stated that the number of encryption rounds R and the number of iterations n are part of the secret key
of the cryptosystem, which calls for a timing attack as it was done in the case of [4] in [8, Sec. IV.B]. As a
matter of fact, one can expect that the EDT increases as n does for most values of R, µa and µb. Similarly,
because the encryption/decryption proceeds through R repeated cycles, the EDT will also become larger if
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the value of R increases. To be more precise, for a given plain image we can expect the following bilinear
relationship between the EDT and the values of n and R:
EDT(n,R) ≈ (c× n+ d)×R+ e, (10)
where c corresponds to the common operations consumed on each map iteration, d to the operations per-
formed in each cycle excluding those involved in the map iterations, and e to those operations performed on
the initialization process and the postprocessing after all the R cycles are completed. In addition, because
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Figure 6: The encryption time for a 512 × 512 image with the following parameters of the image encryption scheme: (a)
µa = 3.9898, µb = 3.8458, y0 = 0.2391; (b) µa = 3.8956, µb = 3.8612, y0 = 0.9501; (c) µa = 3.8542, µb = 3.8998, y0 = 0.2311;
(d) µa = 3.9898, µb = 4, y0 = 0.8989.
µa, µb and y0 are just the control parameters and the initial condition of the chaotic map, it is expected
that EDT will be independent of their values. With the aim of verifying this hypothesis, some numerical
experiments have been made under the following scenario: an 512 × 512 image with random pixel values
was encrypted for different values of µa, µb, y0, n and R. The encryption time corresponding to each key is
shown in Fig. 6, from which one can see that Eq. (10) is verified.
For the sake of clarity, let us examine the effect of the timing attack on the key space of the cryptosystem
described in [6]. The secret key of the basic implementation of that cryptosystem is given by µa, µb, y0, n,
R. According to Pisarchik et al., there exist around 106 possible values for µa, around 106 possible values for
µb, around 1010 possible values for y0, around 103 possible values for n, and 10 possible values for R. In this
case, the key space is #K ≈ 1026. Regarding the timing attack, once the encryption time is known, a brute
force attack on either n or R enables the recovering of either R or n. Since the number of possible values
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for R is smaller than the one concerning n, we should perform a brute force attack on R. As a result, the
new key space is given by #K ≈ 106 · 106 · 1010 · 10 = 1023. Although the reduction of the key space is not
drastic, it exists and should be taken into account during the design and description of the cryptosystem.
The above timing-attack informs that partial knowledge of the key leads to the recovering of other parts
of the key. This is not admissible in the context of well-designed cryptosystems [12, Rule 7]. Consequently,
we must conclude that the cryptosystem defined in [6] is not well designed.
5. Conclusions
Although in [6] it is claimed that the therein introduced cryptosystem is an improvement of [4], we have
shown that both cryptosystems are marred by the same shortcomings that were pointed out in [8, 9]. In
addition, some additional flaws of the cryptosystem in [6] have been reported, too. Indeed, the encryption
procedure described in [6] is based on a non-invertible function, and some parts of the key can be estimated
from the observation of the encryption/decryption times. Moreover, we have shown that the cryptosystem
is not robust against noise, which was presented as a virtue of the cryptosystem by its authors. As a result,
the use for secure communications of the cryptosystem proposed in [6] should be discarded.
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